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Note
Murder and the Military Commissions:
Prohibiting the Executive’s Unauthorized
Expansion of Jurisdiction
Joseph C. Hansen∗
A building crumbled on July 27, 2002, in Afghanistan.1 As
the combat support aircraft roared away, a United States
ground assault team entered the rubble to “clear the target.”2
The soldiers tossed grenades while examining the ruins3 when
suddenly a grenade not thrown by the U.S. forces exploded
nearby, killing Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer.4 The
soldiers, spotting a wounded fighter who had apparently
thrown the grenade, opened fire and shot him several times in
the chest.5 That fighter, fifteen-year old Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, survived.6
∗ J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005,
Grinnell College. The author thanks Professor David S. Weissbrodt for his invaluable mentoring and assistance. He would also like to thank Professor Heidi Kitrosser and the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, notably
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support and to his darling wife Paola for her patience and encouragement.
Copyright © 2009 by Joseph C. Hansen.
1. Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge I for Failure to State an Element of
the Offenses in Violation of Due Process 2, United States v. Khadr, D071 (Ct.
Mil. Comm’n Rev. July 11, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/commissionsKhadr.html (follow “Motion to Dismiss Charge I Due
Process” hyperlink, posted Aug. 26, 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Jeff Tietz, The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr, ROLLING STONE,
Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/11128331. But see
Jane Sutton, Canadian’s Battle Role Cast in Doubt at Guantanamo, REUTERS,
Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUSN12458385 (relaying that SFC Speer may have been killed by friendly fire).
5. See Tietz, supra note 4 (describing Khadr’s shooting); see also Sutton,
supra note 4 (citing emerging evidence that Khadr was buried beneath rubble
and could not have thrown the grenade).
6. See Clifford Krauss, Canadian Teenager Held by U.S. in Afghanistan
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After nearly five years of detention in Afghanistan and
Guantánamo Bay, the U.S. government charged Omar Khadr
with, among other things, Murder in Violation of the Law of
War.7 Almost two years of pretrial wrangling in the Guantánamo military commissions followed, but it is now unclear
when or where Khadr will be tried.8 Nonetheless, the pretrial
exchanges illustrated the problematic nature of the charges related to Murder in Violation of the Law of War: as the Guantánamo defense team protested, killing only violates the law of
war when it is committed against protected persons who take
no active part in the hostilities.9 Omar Khadr, accused of
throwing a hand grenade at an active soldier, committed no
such offense. The military judge, however, denied the defense’s
motion to dismiss, concluding that the killing of an active combatant by an “unlawful combatant” violated the law of war.10
This assertion, which directly conflicts with the established
law of war, could only have been reached by relying on language promulgated by the Secretary of Defense in the Manual
for Military Commissions (MMC).11 The MMC purports to
comply with Congress’s mandate in the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 (MCA) to define elements of crimes consistently
in Killing of American Medic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at A8 (providing
background about Khadr).
7. Referred Charges 4, United States v. Khadr (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev.
Apr. 24, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/
Khadrreferral.pdf.
8. The trial date had been set for January 26, 2009, but President Obama promptly postponed all military commission trials and announced plans
to close the Guantánamo detention facility. See Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama to Close Foreign Prisons and Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2009, at A1.
9. See Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge One for Failure to State an Offense and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1, United States v. Khadr,
D008 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink
.mil/news/commissionsKhadr.html (follow “Motions Sessions (Pleadings Filed
by Counsel—Law Motions/Dec 2007)” hyperlink).
10. See Government’s Response to the Defense’s Motion to Dismiss
Charge I for Failure to State an Element of the Offense in Violation of Due
Process 1–2, United States v. Khadr, D071 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. July 25,
2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissionsKhadr.html
(follow “Motion to Dismiss Charge I Due Process” hyperlink, posted Aug. 26,
2008; Government’s Response attached at the end of the Defense’s Motion) (referring to the Commission’s prior ruling on an earlier motion to dismiss in
Khadr’s case).
11. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, at IV11 to -12 (2007) [hereinafter MMC], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/commissionsmanual.html (follow “Manual for Military Commissions”
hyperlink, posted Jan. 18, 2007).
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with the MCA,12 but instead impermissibly redefines the offense of Murder in Violation of the Law of War by focusing on
the status of the accused rather than the victim.
The MMC’s definition of when the law of war may be violated raises a number of troubling legal issues, from the conflation of independent elements of a crime to executive action
devoid of statutory or constitutional authority. Although Congress entrusted the Secretary of Defense with the responsibility
of defining the individual elements of the crimes,13 Congress
did not—and could not—delegate its constitutional authority to
define offenses against the law of nations.14
This Note argues that the Secretary of Defense acted contrary to the MCA’s explicit mandate and unconstitutionally arrogated Congress’s legislative powers by redefining the crime of
Murder in Violation of the Law of War. Part I outlines when
murder violates the law of war by reviewing the MCA, the established law of war, and the MMC’s novel definition. Part II
examines the deficiencies in the MMC’s definition and analyzes
the lack of statutory and constitutional authority for the Secretary of Defense’s redefinition. Part III contends that judges
should apply the longstanding law of war and that the Obama
Administration should ensure that future law-of-war prosecutions are constitutionally sound. This Note proposes that in
prosecutions for Murder in Violation of the Law of War, judges
should disregard the MMC’s definition and apply the law as
Congress intended: to commit Murder in Violation of the Law of
War, one must violate the law of war. Further, the new administration should avoid executive interpretations of the law of
war that violate the constitutional separation of powers, contravene the law of war, and facilitate potentially lethal criminal
liability.

12. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
13. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006) (“[E]lements and modes of proof, for
cases triable by military commission under this chapter may be prescribed by
the Secretary of Defense . . . .”).
14. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942)
(stating it is Congress’s constitutional power to “defin[e] and punish[ ] offenses
against the law of nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of
war”); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“Congress
may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no more than
the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes.”); United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“[T]he plain principle
[is] that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative [branch] . . . .”).
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I. MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which authorized
trial by military commission for violations of the law of war,
Congress defined the substantive offense of Murder in Violation
of the Law of War.15 While the Act does not define the “law of
war,” widely established norms dictate that murder only violates the law of war when committed against persons taking
no active part in the hostilities. Nonetheless, the Secretary of
Defense, given the authority to outline individual elements of
the crimes in the military commissions,16 redefined when murder violates the law of war by focusing on the status of the offender rather than the victim.17
A. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the
military commission convened by the President to try Guantánamo detainees was not a “regularly constituted court” required by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions18 with
which the Executive must comply.19 The Court suggested that
congressional authorization could remedy the commissions’ deficiencies.20 Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006,21 which created a military commission
system to try detainees held in Guantánamo Bay.22
15. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15).
16. See id. § 949a(a).
17. See MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11 to -12.
18. The “Geneva Conventions” references four individual conventions:
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
19. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008).
20. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775–76; id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”).
21. Military Commissions Act.
22. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that military
commission jurisdiction is limited to violations of the law of
war.23 The MCA recognizes this limited jurisdiction by only
granting jurisdiction “to try any offense made punishable by
[the MCA] or the law of war.”24 According to Congress, the
MCA codifies offenses traditionally triable by military commissions and does not establish new crimes.25 One of the twentyeight substantive offenses listed in the MCA is Murder in Violation of the Law of War, defined as the intentional killing of
“one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation
of the law of war.”26
The MCA grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to
prescribe procedures and rules of evidence for the military
commissions, as long as they are neither contrary to nor inconsistent with the MCA.27 On January 18, 2007, the Secretary of
Defense published the Manual for Military Commissions.28 For
each crime listed in the MCA, the MMC enumerates individual
elements, lists maximum punishments, and provides explanatory comments.29
B. UNIVERSAL NORMS FOR WHEN MURDER VIOLATES THE LAW
OF WAR
Defendants accused of murder are not normally tried in a
military commission. Because the MCA declares that it creates
no new offenses, the predicate jurisdictional hook for the military commissions is that an alleged murder must somehow violate the law of war.30 The law of war is defined by looking to
universal agreement and practice both in this country and
23. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (stating a law-of-war commission has
jurisdiction to try two kinds of offenses: “violations of the laws of war cognizable by military tribunals” and certain “breaches of military orders”) (citing
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 839 (2d ed. 1920)); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) (asserting that to be tried in a military commission, the charge must be a violation of the law of war); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (discussing commissions’ authority to try “offenses against
the law of war”).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a).
25. Id. § 950p.
26. Id. § 950v(b)(15).
27. Id. § 949a(a).
28. MMC, supra note 11.
29. See id. at IV-1 to -22.
30. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (“We must therefore first
inquire whether any of the acts charged is an offense against the law of war
cognizable before a military tribunal.”).
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worldwide.31 U.S. military law, U.S. federal law, and customary
international law are in unanimous agreement: murder, or willful killing, constitutes a violation of the law of war only when
committed against protected persons, who broadly include all
who do not take an active part in the hostilities.32
According to the U.S. military, murder violates the law of
war only when committed against a protected person.33 The
U.S. military defines a violation of the law of war as a war
crime.34 “Willful killing,” or murder, constitutes a war crime
when committed against persons protected by the Geneva Con31. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780 (2006), superseded by
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30
(explaining that Congress chose to adopt the common law system of the law of
war applied by military tribunals to the extent courts deem applicable); see
also L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 52–53 (2d ed.
2000) (“[T]he law of armed conflict is still governed by . . . international customary law . . . .”).
32. Two distinctions must be made. First, killing through perfidy—the
treacherous killing of another, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (8th ed. 2004)—
is a separate violation of the law of war. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 31, at
145–47. Second, killing using a prohibited weapon is another way to violate
the law of war. See, e.g., Bill Boothby, The Law of Weaponry—Is It Adequate?,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 297, 298 (Michael Schmitt &
Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) (explaining the fundamental principles of the law of
weaponry). The actual war crime, however, is employing a prohibited weapon,
which is an independent crime from Murder in Violation of the Law of War.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xx),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 96. The U.S. military, largely in line with the
international community, prohibits use of the following weapons: weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, weapons that have an indiscriminate
effect, poison, gases, and chemical or bacteriological warfare. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 18–20
(2007), [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK], available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469294&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; U.S. DEP’T
OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT
AND AIR OPERATIONS: AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31 §§ 6-3(b)–(c), 6-4 (1976)
[hereinafter AFP 110-31] (rescinded in 2006 and not yet replaced); U.S. DEP’T
OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: FIELD MANUAL 27-10 app. A-10 to
-11 (1956) (as modified by Change No. 1, July 15, 1976), [hereinafter FM 2710], available at http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/files/FM27-10.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M §§ 9.1.1, 9.1.2, 10.3, 10.4 (2007), [hereinafter NAVAL
HANDBOOK], available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/ild/documents/1-14M_
(Jul_2007)_(NWP).pdf. Hand grenades are not prohibited. See FM 27-10, supra, app. A-11; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra, § 9.5.
33. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 16–17; FM 27-10, supra note
32, app. A-118; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 6.2.6.
34. FM 27-10, supra note 32, app. A-117; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note
32, § 6.2.6.
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ventions.35 Protected persons include civilians taking no active
part in the hostilities, enemies hors de combat,36 and survivors
of ships and aircraft lost at sea.37 Besides the war crime of killing those protected by the Geneva Conventions, the only other
listed war crimes involving murder are summary executions of
persons in custody and bombardment with the deliberate purpose of killing protected civilians.38 Both of these crimes are
still murder of protected persons—soldiers hors de combat and
civilians taking no active part in the hostilities.39
Congress made war crimes a federal offense in 1996.40 In
2006, in response to Hamdan and concerns that U.S. personnel
could be prosecuted for war crimes, Congress narrowed the definition of a war crime through the MCA to include only a
“grave breach” of the Geneva Conventions (previously any
breach of the Geneva Conventions constituted a war crime).41
The statute further defines murder as a grave breach when
committed against one or more persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including those no longer able to participate in
combat.42
35. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 35; AFP 110-31, supra note 32, §
15-2(b) (defining “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that constitute war crimes, including “willful killing”); FM 27-10, supra note 32, app. A118; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 6.2.6.
36. Hors de combat, a French term literally meaning “out of the fight,” refers to soldiers no longer able to take an active part in the hostilities due to
injury. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 600 (11th ed. 2003).
37. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 28–30; NAVAL HANDBOOK,
supra note 32, § 6.2.6 (listing examples of war crimes).
38. AFP 110-31, supra note 32, § 15-3(c) (listing other war crimes in addition to grave breaches); FM 27-10, supra note 32, app. A-118 (same).
39. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) (describing the purpose of
the law of war as “protect[ing] civilian populations and prisoners of war from
brutality”).
40. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006)).
41. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1)(A),
120 Stat. 2600, 2633 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3)); see MICHAEL JOHN
GARCIA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE WAR CRIMES ACT: CURRENT ISSUES, 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33662.pdf
(detailing the amendments to the War Crimes Act as a result of Hamdan). The
War Crimes Act names two other kinds of war crimes: conduct prohibited by
designated articles of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV and conduct prohibited by the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps, and Other Devices (Protocol II). 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2), (4).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(D). In a hearing prior to amending the War
Crimes Act, the Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel responding to whether murder was a war crime, stated: “If committed
in circumstances of an armed conflict against a protected person under the
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The Geneva Conventions, the international touchstone for
defining violations of the law of war,43 state that the willful
killing of a protected person constitutes a grave breach.44 Protected persons are those taking no active part in the hostilities,
such as civilians, wounded members of armed forces, and medical and religious personnel.45 The International Criminal Court
entertains jurisdiction over various murder crimes, which require that the perpetrator kill a person protected by the Geneva Conventions.46 The International Committee of the Red
Cross, in its comprehensive review of international humanitarian law, states that murder is a war crime if the victim is a
person protected under the Geneva Conventions.47 Customary
international humanitarian law protects the following people,
so long as they do not participate in the hostilities: medical personnel, religious personnel, humanitarian relief personnel, personnel involved in peacekeeping missions, journalists, and per-

laws of war internationally, it can be a war crime, yes.” The Authority to Prosecute Terrorists Under the War Crime Provisions of Title 18: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Steven
Bradbury, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen.).
43. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 31, at 43 (describing the Geneva Conventions as “one of the most significant developments in the law of armed conflict”).
44. Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, art. 50; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 18, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 18, art. 130; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 18, art. 147.
45. Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, arts. 3, 12, 24; Geneva Convention II, supra note 18, arts. 3, 12, 30; Geneva Convention III, supra note 18,
arts. 3, 33; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 18, arts. 3, 16, 20. For a discussion of the appropriate application of the individual Geneva Conventions and
international law to Guantánamo detainees, see David Weissbrodt & Andrea
W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of
Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 356–61
(2008).
46. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a), (c),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 94 –95, 97; PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(b)(vi),
8(2)(c)(i)-1, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/prepcomm/report/prepreportdocs.htm (follow “E”
hyperlink next to “Elements of Crimes”) (listing the elements of the war
crimes of willful killing, killing a person hors de combat, and murder, respectively). A fourth murder crime is perfidy. PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE INT’L
CRIMINAL COURT, supra, art. 8(2)(b)(xi); see also supra note 32.
47. 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 311 (Jean Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds.,
2005).
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sons hors de combat.48 Other scholars reach the same conclusions.49
Significantly, the U.S. military, federal law, and international sources all refer to the Geneva Conventions to state that
murder only violates the law of war when it is committed
against protected persons, who broadly include those taking no
active part in the hostilities. In all of these sources, the offense
is defined in relation to the victim: if the victim is a protected
person, then the murderer violates the law of war, regardless of
the offender’s status.
C. THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS: A NOVEL
DEFINITION
Given the unanimous agreement regarding when murder
violates the law of war, it seems logical that the MCA crime,
Murder in Violation of the Law of War, would require that
murder be committed against those taking no active part in the
hostilities. When the Secretary of Defense enumerated the individual elements of the crime in the MMC, however, he gave
an expansive and unprecedented definition for when the law of
war may be violated.50
The MMC “provides guidance” with respect to the MCA
crimes.51 According to the MMC, Murder in Violation of the
Law of War requires that the killing be unlawful and that the
killing violate the law of war.52 A comment in the MMC, purporting to explain the element of violating the law of war,
states that an accused may violate the law of war simply by

48. Id. at 79, 88, 105, 112, 115, 164.
49. See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (2005); GREEN, supra note 31, at 124 –25; HansPeter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 237, 256 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008);
Jann. K. Kleffner, Protection of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra, at 325, 329–30,
346–49; Nilendra Kumar, Religious Personnel, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra, at 419, 427.
50. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006) (enabling the Secretary of Defense to
define elements of crimes triable by military commissions); MMC, supra note
11, at IV-11 to -12 (defining the elements of the crime of Murder in Violation of
the Law of War).
51. MMC, supra note 11, at IV-1.
52. Id. at IV-12.

1880

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1871

taking acts as an “unlawful combatant.”53 The MMC provides
no legal authority to support the comment.54 This definition,
unlike U.S. military law, U.S. federal law, and customary international law, considers only the status of the offender, rather than the status of the victim as a protected person taking
no active part in the hostilities.
II. (RE)DEFINING THE LAW OF WAR
The comment in the MMC, by defining a violation of the
law of war in relation to the status of the accused rather than
the victim, inverts the established law of war and broadens the
scope of the offense.55 The redefinition presents more than academic concern: if judges continue to apply the Secretary of Defense’s definition, more detainees could face prosecution for
Murder in Violation of the Law of War apparently without having violated the law of war.56 Since the military commissions
have multiple procedural shortcuts,57 and since a conviction of
Murder in Violation of the Law of War can carry the death penalty,58 it is a matter of fundamental justice that the military
commission—or any substitute tribunal59—must possess legitimate jurisdiction over those charged with this crime.
This Part first examines the deficiencies in the MMC’s re53. Id. (referring to the comment to the crime of intentionally causing serious bodily injury); id. at IV-11 (commenting on the meaning of “acting in violation of the law of war”).
54. Id.
55. Compare id. (defining violations of the law of war based on whether
the accused is a lawful combatant), with Geneva Convention I, supra note 18,
art. 50 (defining grave breaches as prohibited acts “committed against persons
or property protected by the Convention”), Geneva Convention II, supra note
18, art. 51 (same), Geneva Convention III, supra note 18, art. 130 (same), and
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 18, art. 147 (same).
56. The U.S. government has charged multiple detainees with some form
of Murder in Violation of the Law of War. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military
Commissions, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2009) (follow hyperlinks for individual names to view the charges of
each) (charging al Bahlul, al Hawsawi, Al-Nashiri, Aziz Ali, Binalshibh, Bin
‘Attash, Ghailani, Jawad, Khadr, and Mohammed). At least some of these
charges allege facts similar to Khadr. See id. (listing the charges and specifications leveled against Khadr and each of the other listed detainees).
57. See Weissbrodt & Templeton, supra note 45, at 400 (noting the lack of
procedural safeguards to guarantee fair trials under the MMC).
58. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15) (2006).
59. See Joby Warrick & Karen DeYoung, Obama Reverses Bush Policies
on Detention and Interrogation, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at A6 (stating that
some detainees may be prosecuted in “special national security courts or even
revised military commissions”).
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definition. It then analyzes statutory and constitutional bases
for the MMC’s definition, concluding that the Secretary acted
without legal authority to redefine the offense.
A. AN INVERTED, CONFLATED, AND EXPANSIVE DEFINITION
The MMC’s definition drastically broadens the scope of
Murder in Violation of the Law of War by conflating two elements of the crime.60 The MMC requires as two independent
elements that the killing be unlawful and that the killing violate the law of war.61 Killing unlawfully is not the same as violating the law of war.62 During armed conflict, lawful combatants receive combatant immunity for killing other
combatants.63 The converse is that an unprivileged belligerent—or an “unlawful enemy combatant” in the MCA’s terminology64—does not receive combatant immunity for killing other combatants.65 If an unprivileged belligerent commits
murder, he or she has not de facto violated the law of war, but
also does not enjoy combatant immunity and may be subject to
criminal prosecution for murder.66 For this reason, the second
sentence in the MMC’s comment, which states it is generally
accepted international practice that unlawful enemy combatants may be prosecuted for offenses such as murder,67 while
technically correct, is specious. It is true that unprivileged belligerents can face prosecution, but such a prosecution does not
alone establish a violation of the law of war or, consequently,
military commission jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the government need only prove the combatant
was unlawful, the crime would be better labeled as Murder by
an Unprivileged Belligerent, which was a crime in the pre-MCA
60. MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11 to -12.
61. Id. at IV-12.
62. See George P. Fletcher, On the Crimes Subject to Prosecution in the
Military Commissions, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 39, 44 (2007) (“If an unprivileged
combatant kills someone, it is not clear why the homicide should be regarded
as violation of the law of war.”).
63. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate
Levels of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209, 212 (2005).
64. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006).
65. Jensen, supra note 63, at 212–13 (describing combatant status as an
“all-or-nothing proposition”).
66. See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 367, 437–38 (2004); Audrey Macklin, The Omar Khadr Case: Redefining War Crimes, JURIST, Oct. 31, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2008/10/omar-khadr-case-redefining-war-crimes.php.
67. See MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11.
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version of the military commissions.68 That crime required only
that the accused commit murder as an “unlawful combatant”
and did not mention the law of war.69 When Congress passed
the MCA, it incorporated all but two of the substantive offenses
in the pre-MCA military commissions, leaving out Murder by
an Unprivileged Belligerent and Destruction of Property by an
Unprivileged Belligerent.70 These omissions were likely intentional because Congress recognized that committing acts as an
“unlawful combatant” does not in and of itself violate the law of
war.71
By stating that any action taken by an “unlawful combatant” violates the law of war, the comment in the MMC conflates the separate elements of unlawfulness and violating the
law of war.72 Cogently, in the words of the U.S. Air Force: “‘Unlawful combatants’ is a term used to describe only . . . lack of
standing to engage in hostilities, not whether a violation of the
law of armed conflict occurred or criminal responsibility accrued.”73
The charges against Omar Khadr illustrate the point:
Khadr is accused of killing an active soldier, which—according
to U.S. military, federal, and international standards—is not a
protected person.74 Therefore, Khadr’s alleged actions would
not have violated the law of war, since the victim was not a protected person. Nonetheless, because Khadr was not a privileged
combatant, he could have been tried under U.S. criminal law in
U.S. federal court for murder.75 The MMC’s definition, howev68. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2,
§ 6(B)(3) (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/dod/milcomm43003inst2.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Compare id. § 6(B)(3)–(4), with 10 U.S.C. § 950v (2006).
71. See Noman Goheer, Comment, The Unilateral Creation of International Law During the “War on Terror”: Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent
Is Not a War Crime, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 533, 546 (2007) (“A war crime inherently requires an overt infraction of the law of war, not just committing a
domestic crime without combatant immunity.”).
72. See Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 61
(2007) (“[A]bsent some other violation, a war crime based solely on the killing
of a combatant who is engaged in hostilities is problematic under the Geneva
Conventions.”).
73. AFP 110-31, supra note 32, § 3-3.
74. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, arts. 3, 12 (protecting
only soldiers that have laid down their arms, are hors de combat, or are
wounded or sick).
75. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 17 (“Unprivileged bellige-
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er, by drastically broadening the scope of the offense and, by
consequence, the commission’s jurisdiction, allows the government to try Khadr in a military commission. This result illustrates the fundamental difference in the MMC’s approach: by
defining a violation in terms of the combatant’s status, any action taken by an “unlawful combatant” can be held to violate
the law of war.76
The accused’s combatant status, however, has no bearing
on whether the accused killed a protected person. In place of a
carefully delineated and internationally accepted law of war
protecting those taking no active part in the hostilities, the
MMC transforms the expression “violation of the law of war” to
include those who have killed without combatant immunity,
which only establishes unlawfulness, not a violation of the law
of war.
In defense of the MMC, one could argue that Congress explicitly addressed protected persons in the MCA’s substantive
offense of Murder of Protected Persons.77 The MCA defines
“protected persons” as those protected under the Geneva Conventions.78 In other words, the crime of Murder of Protected
Persons seems to be the same as the appropriate interpretation
of Murder in Violation of the Law of War. Nothing appears in
the legislative history concerning the two substantive offenses,
leaving the reason for the existence of two separate offenses to
divination.
The simplest explanation is that Congress tried to remedy
the untenable pre-MCA crime of Murder by an Unprivileged
Belligerent by adding the appropriate jurisdictional hook of a
violation of the law of war and, at the same time, kept Murder
of Protected Persons intact between both versions.79 Another
possible explanation is that because Murder of Protected Perrents are not entitled to prisoner of war status, and may be prosecuted under
the domestic law of the captor.”); Macklin, supra note 66.
76. As one commentator ironically notes, “Khadr would have the legal status of a deer during hunting season—fair game for coalition forces to kill at
will yet possessing no right to fight back.” David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted
Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 186 (2008).
77. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(1) (2006). For a discussion of the differences between the MCA and the MMC’s definition of this crime, see Geoffrey S. Corn,
Questioning the Jurisdictional Moorings of the Military Commissions Act, 43
TEX. INT’L L.J. 29, 36–38 (2007).
78. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(a)(2).
79. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 68, § 6(B)(3), with 10
U.S.C. § 950v.
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sons does not reference the law of war, Murder in Violation of
the Law of War could be broader in certain applications, since
it facially incorporates the entire law of war corpus. For example, killing with a prohibited arm violates the law of war,80 but
the MCA crime Employing Poison or Similar Weapons provides
a narrower definition for prohibited weapons than the standard
law of war.81 Therefore, it is possible that a person could kill
with a weapon, such as projectiles filled with glass, prohibited
by the law of war but not by the MCA,82 and the U.S. government would be able to establish jurisdiction in the military
commission through Murder in Violation of the Law of War.
Regardless, the existence of Murder of Protected Persons
neither affects the legal standards for when murder violates
the law of war nor remedies the deficiencies in the MMC’s definition. If anything, it strengthens the established norm that a
military commission only has jurisdiction over violations of the
law of war, such as the murder of protected persons.
B. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSGRESSIONS
Given that the MMC redefines when the law of war may be
violated, the crucial inquiry is whether the Secretary of Defense has the statutory or constitutional authority to do so. The
scope of the Secretary’s authority to redefine when the law of
war may be violated turns on the location of military commissions in the constitutional system, the specific statutory authorization in the MCA, and a broader separation of powers question over who is authorized or qualified to define violations of
the law of war.83
1. Military Commissions in a Tripartite Government
Military commissions “born of military necessity” are
strange creatures that lie somewhere between the Constitution
80. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xx), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 96.
81. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(8) (defining a prohibited weapon as one
that kills or produces serious, lasting harm through “asphyxiating, bacteriological, or toxic properties”), with supra note 32 (noting that the standard law
of war prohibits weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering and those
that have an indiscriminate effect).
82. See FM 27-10, supra note 32, at 17–19.
83. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J.,
concurring) (“[N]either can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude
upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President.”).
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and statutory authorization.84 The Supreme Court has never
decided whether the President has the constitutional power to
convene military commissions without congressional authorization.85 In Hamdan, however, the Court found the lack of “military necessity” to be a basic shortcoming to the Executive’s alternative argument that he could establish a military
commission without congressional authorization.86 Instead, the
Court required the Executive to seek congressional authorization to create a military commission,87 which he received when
Congress passed the MCA in 2006.88 Therefore, it will primarily
be a matter of statutory interpretation to ascertain whether the
Secretary of Defense exceeded his delegated authority when defining the elements of Murder in Violation of the Law of War.
Nonetheless, because the Secretary of Defense operates
under the President and exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense,89 any contradiction between the MMC and the MCA also raises fundamental separation-of-powers issues over which branch of the government is
constitutionally empowered to define the law of war.90 Guaranteeing the appropriate separation of powers is significant: myriad are the high Court’s cases that discuss the division of the
government as fundamental to securing individual liberty.91

84. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006), superseded by
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008).
85. Id. at 2774.
86. Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”).
88. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
89. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Top Civilian and Military Leaders, http://www
.defenselink.mil/home/top-leaders (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
90. See Corn, supra note 77, at 38 (asking, but not answering: “[W]hat
branch of our government is best suited to decide which crimes are heard by
the military commission?”).
91. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 269
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
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2. Congress’s Expressed Intent Precludes the Secretary of
Defense from Redefining the Law of War
The Constitution sets forth the war powers of the legislative and executive branches in broad terms,92 but more often,
“the question of presidential power in the context of war and
terrorism is one of statutory interpretation.”93 Recognizing that
the Guantánamo military commissions are statutory creations,94 Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer provides the appropriate framework for interpreting the validity of executive action, particularly in the context of war.95 The tripartite framework divides
executive action into three zones—with congressional authorization, in the absence of congressional action, and contrary to
the will of Congress—to determine how much deference the
Court should grant the Executive’s action.96 In the first zone,
the President’s authority is at its maximum and supported by
the strongest presumption of validity.97 The second zone of
Jackson’s framework is inapplicable, since Congress acted by
passing the MCA.98 In the third zone, courts can sustain executive action only if it is beyond the scope of all congressional
power.99 Such executive claims, however, must be closely scrutinized, as the “equilibrium” of the “constitutional system” is at
stake.100
While it appears that the Secretary of Defense acted with
congressional authorization because he promulgated the MMC
92. Congress’s war powers are found in Article I, § 8. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8. The executive’s constitutional war power is to “be the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
93. Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169,
1169 (2006); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2133 (2005)
(“[I]t is essential to determine what Congress has, and has not, authorized.”).
94. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(b) (2006).
95. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in
Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 107 (2002); see also Harold
Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 351–52 (1986).
96. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38.
97. Id. at 635–37.
98. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 637.
99. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38.
100. Id. at 638.
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pursuant to the MCA, Congress required that the elements of
proof not be contrary to or inconsistent with the MCA,101 and
therefore, by redefining when the law of war may be violated,
the Secretary of Defense acted contrary to the expressed will of
Congress.
Congress only authorized the Secretary of Defense to enact
elements of proof that would be consistent with the MCA.102
The MCA declares that it does not establish new offenses, and
only purports to codify previously existing crimes.103 If the
MCA had created new crimes, detainees could only be tried for
offenses occurring after the passage of the MCA, something
that Congress explicitly avoided.104 While there is substantial
skepticism that Congress did not create new crimes in the
MCA,105 as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Secretary
of Defense was not authorized to act contrary to the explicit
will of Congress by creating a new crime.106 Altering when the
law of war may be violated redefines the crime of Murder in Violation of the Law of War.
Another canon of statutory interpretation, known as the
Charming Betsy doctrine, weighs against allowing the Secretary of Defense to craft a new definition for when the law of
war may be violated. In Murray v. Charming Betsy, the Court
declared that an act of Congress should never be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.107 Since the law of war is defined by looking to international practice,108 interpreting the MCA to allow the Secretary
of Defense to redefine the law of war unilaterally would be
choosing a construction of the MCA that would defy the international definition and application of the law of war. Instead, it
would be reasonable to interpret the MCA as conforming to the

101. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 950p.
104. Id. § 950p(b) (stating the offenses are declarative of existing law and
“do not preclude trial for crimes that occurred before the date” of enactment).
105. See Weissbrodt & Templeton, supra note 45, at 364 (“[T]he MCA adds
new crimes to those previously known in international law.”); see also Gabor
Rona, Legal Issues in the “War on Terrorism”—Reflecting on the Conversation
Between Silja N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711, 731 (2008)
(same).
106. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 949a(a), 950p.
107. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
108. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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international law of war by not creating a new offense for when
murder violates the law of war.
Additionally, Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”109 Congress mentions “law of war” no less than nineteen
times in the MCA, but never defines the expression.110 If Congress meant the “law of war” to mean anything other than the
traditional expression, or if Congress wanted the Secretary of
Defense to interpret or define the law of war, it easily could
have so stated.111 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the
Secretary of Defense acted contrary to Congress’s express will
and, consequently, without statutory authorization.112
This reasoning places the Secretary of Defense’s actions into the third zone of the Jackson framework, where the executive branch’s constitutional powers only pass muster if they are
beyond the reach of Congress’s constitutional powers.113 In other words, even though the Secretary of Defense acted contrary
to congressional authorization, the MMC’s definition is valid if
the Secretary possessed the constitutional power to redefine
the offense.
3. The Constitutional Separation of Powers
The Secretary of Defense’s action raises three distinct constitutional inquiries. First, since defining when murder violates
the law of war was an act of a legislative nature,114 could Congress have delegated such law-making authority to the Executive? Second, even if Congress could not delegate such authority, are the Executive and the Secretary of Defense
constitutionally empowered to make such decisions? Third, if
109. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
110. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
111. See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1578 (2008) (stating if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate the definition of
felony, it “easily could have” written the statute to say so); Idaho v. United
States, 533 U.S. 262, 277 (2001) (“Congress was free to define the reservation
boundaries however it saw fit.”).
112. Another commentator, considering the separate offense of Murder of
Protected Persons, reaches the same conclusion. See Corn, supra note 77, at 38
(“There is no authority in the MCA for the Department of Defense to redefine
and lessen the proof requirements of the statute.”).
113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
114. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 399, 919 (8th ed. 2004) (defining crime
as “[a]n act that the law makes punishable,” and legislative as “[o]f or relating
to lawmaking”).
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not, do concerns of national security and terrorism allow the relaxation of constitutional safeguards in order for the executive
branch to act effectively?
a. The Nondelegation Doctrine Prohibits Congress from
Delegating Authority to Define the Law of War
In areas of delegation, the constitutional separation of
powers between Congress and the Executive is not firmly
moored.115 As an outer boundary, Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its legislative powers to another branch under
the nondelegation doctrine.116 Congress may, however, delegate
authority to the executive branch to secure the effect intended
by the legislation, so long as Congress creates “an intelligible
principle” to which the person or body authorized to execute the
delegated authority is directed to conform.117 The Supreme
Court declined to answer whether a higher standard applies
when Congress delegates the authority to define criminal conduct.118 The nondelegation doctrine, although still good law,119
has proven largely theoretical in practice because courts are reluctant to invalidate legislation.120 Courts have upheld dele-

115. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406,
409 (1928) (“[T]he extent and character . . . [of permissible delegation] must be
fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.”).
116. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital . . . .”).
117. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; see also Interstate Commerce Comm’n
v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 (1912) (“The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having laid down the
general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require
of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and
the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter
within the rules laid down by Congress.”).
118. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991). But see
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness
of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the
moral condemnation of the community, legislatures . . . should define criminal
activity.”).
119. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–88
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (contending that the Court should apply the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a legislative provision).
120. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (stating
that the doctrine has “been driven by a practical understanding” and noting
that no statute has been found unconstitutional for delegating too much authority since 1935).
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gated authority to define crimes provided adequate notice exists for the defendant.121
In the MCA, Congress only delegated to the Secretary of
Defense the ability to define procedures and rules consistent
with the MCA.122 This delegation does not violate the nondelegation doctrine because the legislation provides an intelligible
principle: to define procedures and rules not contrary to or inconsistent with the legislation.123 Rather, this delegation reasonably recognized the Department of Defense’s expertise for
defining procedures related to such delicate matters as treatment of confidential information.124
Interpreting the delegated authority to allow the Secretary
of Defense to craft new definitions of when the law of war may
be violated, however, rapidly approaches the boundaries of
permissible constitutional delegation. First, it is not clear that
Congress even has the power to redefine the law of war.125 In
United States v. Schultz, the Court of Military Appeals held
that negligent vehicular homicide was not a cognizable crime
under the law of war.126 Relying on Ex parte Quirin, the court
looked to “customs and usages of civilized nations” and whether
Congress had “codified” or “defined” universally accepted violations of the law of war.127 This language, alongside the constitutional power to “define offenses against the law of nations,”128
suggests that Congress can only codify existing offenses against
the law of war, not create new or redefine existing ones. If Con121. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26 n.175 (2002). But see B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d
987, 991–92 (Fla. 1994) (criticizing the federal courts’ failure to read the Constitution textually and prevent Congress from delegating authority to define
crimes).
122. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006).
123. Id. But see Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and
Options, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 29, 40 (2008) (noting that the broad delegations in
the MCA to the Secretary of Defense are problematic).
124. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b).
125. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) (stating congressional action could not authorize trial in a military commission unless the charge was a
violation of the law of war); George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and its Pathologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 546 (2007) (describing the constitutional interpretation of Hamdan as holding the law of war is incorporated
into the constitutional structure and “cannot be redefined by a simple law of
Congress”).
126. United States v. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. 512, 522–23 (C.M.A. 1952).
127. Id.
128. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added).
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gress cannot redefine the law of war, it cannot delegate a power
that it lacks.129
Even if Congress has the power to redefine the law of war,
it is Congress, not the Executive, which has the constitutional
power to define offenses against the law of nations, including
the law of war.130 The Constitution separates this congressional
power from domestic lawmaking.131 While the “present-day federal conception of administrative involvement in defining
crimes remains rife with unresolved tensions,”132 the ability to
define offenses against the law of nations implicates a separate
constitutional congressional power, which the Supreme Court
indicated cannot be exercised by the Executive.133
Additionally, permitting the Secretary of Defense to define
violations of the law of war raises issues of notice. The Supreme
Court allowed Congress to delegate crime definition provided
adequate notice exists for the defendant, as required by the
Constitution.134 Allowing the Secretary of Defense to redefine
the law of war for jurisdiction in a military commission designed to try detainees for acts committed prior to the legislation contravenes basic norms of notice: before the MMC, there
was no basis to believe that murder would violate the law of
war based on the offender’s, rather than the victim’s, status.135
Furthermore, at least theoretically, by limiting the authority Congress may delegate, the nondelegation doctrine may also
intrinsically limit the authority the executive branch can exercise.136 Logically, if Congress lacked the constitutional authori129. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532, 573–74 (2000) (“[I]f Congress itself lacks that interpretive power, then Congress cannot delegate that power to an administrative agency.”).
130. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749, 2779–80 (2006) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
131. Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define . . . Offences against
the Law of Nations”), with id. cl. 1 (the Spending Clause), and id. cl. 3 (the
Commerce Clause).
132. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1994).
133. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2779–80.
134. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996).
135. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo
Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 172, 180 (2008) (stating it is an ex post facto violation to “subject a defendant to trial for a violation of the law of war that was
not a violation of the law of war at the time the unlawful conduct took place”).
136. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
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ty to delegate the definition of the law of war, then that authority rests solely with Congress and the Secretary of Defense constitutionally cannot define the law of war, regardless of what
the statute says.
Reading the MCA to delegate to the Secretary of Defense
the ability to define violations of the law of war approaches and
likely encroaches on the constitutional limits of congressional
delegation. Such an interpretation indicates that the MCA is
unconstitutional for impermissibly delegating Congress’s constitutional powers. After all, it is Congress—not the Secretary
of Defense—that is constitutionally empowered to define offenses against the law of nations. Instead, reading the MCA to
not delegate the ability to define the law of war upholds clear
constitutional roles and eschews constitutional uncertainty.
b. The Executive Lacks Inherent Constitutional Powers to
Define the Law of War
Even if statutes and congressional delegation preclude the
Secretary of Defense from redefining the law of war, the executive branch might argue that its inherent constitutional wartime powers extend beyond the reach of Congress. The Supreme Court formally invokes deference to the political
branches in war137 and national security matters,138 but the
317–18 (2000) (“The most convincing claim on behalf of the conventional [nondelegation] doctrine is . . . that certain highly sensitive decisions should be
made by Congress . . . .”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 446 (2007) (stating the result of the largely toothless nondelegation doctrine has nonetheless “not been unlimited discretion for
agencies”). But see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(emphasizing that the nondelegation doctrine acts solely as a limit on Congress).
137. There is considerable skepticism that the “war on terror” constitutes
an actual war. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1029, 1034 (2004) (“[T]he ‘war on terrorism’ is merely a metaphor
without decisive legal significance, more like the ‘war on drugs’ or the ‘war on
crime’ . . . .”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 958 (2002) (“We
are fighting an international criminal organization . . . . But we have declared
war on no nation.”); Adam Roberts, The “War on Terror” in Historical Perspective, 47 SURVIVAL 101, 125 (2005) (arguing a better description would be “international campaign against terrorism”). Nonetheless, recent Supreme Court
cases demonstrate a concern for national security and recognition of some
form of conflict. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (referring to “active hostilities”),
superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as
recognized in Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241–42.
138. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276.

2009]

MURDER AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS

1893

specific constitutional boundaries between the executive and
legislative branches are far from clear.139 At one end, the Bush
Administration argued for strong, inherent constitutional war
powers beyond the control of Congress.140 At the other end, the
concept of an Executive wielding “virtually unlimited powers,”
has been repeatedly rebuked as fundamentally at odds with the
constitutional separation of powers.141 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refrains from drawing clear lines around the Executive’s constitutional wartime powers.142
There are several arguments that defeat a claim of inherent executive power to define the law of war. First, Congress
has the explicit constitutional power to define offenses against
the law of nations.143 In contrast, the Commander-in-Chief
power solely grants the President the ability to command and
direct the armed forces.144 This explicit congressional power
makes claims of inherent executive power to define when the
law of war may be violated difficult to substantiate.145 Even if
one were to claim that somehow the executive branch may redefine the law of war, it is “well-established” that some of the
President’s substantive constitutional powers are permissible

139. See Kinkopf, supra note 93, at 1169; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative
Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673,
2675 (2005).
140. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President 37–39 (Aug. 1, 2002), [hereinafter Torture Memo], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (arguing that the
President has “an unenumerated ‘executive power,’” and that Congress cannot
regulate “the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority
in the President”).
141. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62 (1981); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress has not issued the
Executive a ‘blank check.’”).
142. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 (“Our opinion does not undermine
the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate . . . .”).
143. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.
144. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Hillman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander in
Chief, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1037, 1041 (2008) (noting that Alexander Hamilton
deprecated the commander-in-chief power).
145. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (stating the President has
the power to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress “defining and punishing offences against the law of nations, including those which pertain to
the conduct of war”).
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only until superseded by statute.146 If the executive branch
were to possess some inherent constitutional power to define
violations of the law of war, such a power would be “provisional”147 and would have been superseded by passage of the MCA.
Second, the Supreme Court already indicated that Congress has the power to define the jurisdiction and procedures of
military commissions.148 Subject matter jurisdiction in a military commission revolves around the nature of the offense,149 so
defining the offense is an essential component of defining jurisdiction. Stating that the executive branch has the constitutional authority to define jurisdiction over military commissions by
defining the predicate substantive offenses would ignore one of
the central pillars of Hamdan: in the realm of military commissions, the Executive only exercises authority subordinate to
Congress.150
Third, the Secretary of Defense is not the President. The
Executive’s constitutional power is to be the Commander in
Chief.151 Claims for expansive executive power center on the
President as an individual, who acts with purpose and energy
as the military commander of the nation’s forces.152 While the
Secretary of Defense certainly plays an important role as the
principal defense policy advisor to the President,153 claims of
strong constitutional executive power lose relevance when applied to a subordinate acting within, not leading, the executive
branch.154
146. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 742 (2008); see also id. at 742–43 n.167 (citing examples of commander-in-chief powers superseded by statute).
147. Id. at 742.
148. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2804 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42
U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42
(2008).
149. See cases cited supra note 23.
150. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 –75 (noting the lack of congressional
authorization for military commissions); id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(adding that the Executive must seek congressional authorization to create
military commissions); id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Congress, not the Executive, prescribes the limits for military commissions).
151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
152. See Torture Memo, supra note 140, at 37.
153. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, supra note 89.
154. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 146, at 696–97 (stating that the
President must retain control over military discretion in armed conflict and
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The argument that the executive branch possesses some
form of inherent power to redefine the law of war is constitutionally bankrupt. Without the constitutional power to define
the law of war, the Secretary of Defense can only claim that
given the potential devastation of terrorist attacks, national security concerns mandate loosening constitutional formalities.
c. No Emergency Necessitates Relaxing Constitutional
Safeguards
As a final defense to redefining the law of war, the executive branch could claim that somewhat apart from constitutional boundaries, it alone is best qualified to address issues of
national security and terrorism, and that defining when and
how detained persons should be tried is a necessary component
of that power.155 This argument, however, is a variant on the
one rejected in Hamdan, where the Court decided that no
emergency prevented the executive branch from consulting
with Congress.156 Moreover, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court
again rebuked similar claims of exigency in the face of potential
terrorist attacks, stating that the political branches could engage in a “genuine debate” about how to preserve constitutional
values while protecting the country from terrorism.157 In
Youngstown, during a national emergency, the Court rejected
unilateral executive action.158
Both Hamdan, which rejected the constitutional ability of
the Executive to convoke military commissions in the absence
of an emergency, and Boumediene, which prohibited the Executive and Congress from suspending habeas corpus for detaithat “Congress may not assign such ultimate decisionmaking discretion to anyone else (including subordinate military officers)”).
155. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 16 (2007) (“The reason for relaxing constitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties inherent in expansive executive power . . . are justified by the national security
benefits.”).
156. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42
U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42
(2008). In Justice Kennedy’s observation: “The Constitution is best preserved
by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures of
the moment. These principles seem vindicated here, for a case that may be of
extraordinary importance is resolved by ordinary rules.” Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
158. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952).
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nees, considered broad legal questions addressing terrorism.159
The definition of a crime within a military commission, in contrast, presents a subsidiary legal question in the larger approach to countering terrorism and protecting national security. Therefore, the logic of both cases should extend to denying
the Secretary of Defense the ability to redefine when murder
violates the law of war. In the absence of a national emergency,
the Executive simply has no claim on arrogating congressional
powers.160 General concerns of national security do not override
constitutional safeguards.161
Additionally, Congress already passed the MCA, which
creates a tribunal system specifically tailored to prosecuting
detainees in the context of terrorism and national security.162
The existence of this legislation further derails any claim that
the executive branch needs to act beyond or contrary to congressional authorization in the face of national security. The
Executive received statutory authorization to prosecute individuals in a system specifically designed to meet policy concerns in the “war on terror.”
Congress fulfilled its constitutional role by defining offenses against the law of nations, and the executive branch is
left to implement the law, not redefine it. The executive branch
possesses no constitutional power to amend or contravene Congress in the realm of defining the law of war.
III. ENSURING FAIR PROSECUTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE LAW OF WAR
Because the Secretary of Defense conclusively lacked statutory or constitutional authority to redefine Murder in Violation of the Law of War, those accused of the crime should only
be convicted if the government proves every element of the offense, including that the accused violated the law of war. Although President Obama has announced that Guantánamo will
159. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 –75; Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
160. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (holding that even during a national emergency,
“the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker”).
161. See Stephen Reinhardt, Weakening the Bill of Rights: A Victory for
Terrorism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 963, 968 (2008) (stating that deference to the
executive does not mean abdication of constitutional protections).
162. See James Nicholas Boeving, The Right to Be Present Before Military
Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting National Security in an Age of
Classified Information, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463, 570–71 (2007).
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be closed within the first year of his presidency,163 the debate
over closing Guantánamo has focused largely on placing the detainees in detention facilities and tribunal systems.164 An important and overlooked question concerns the substantive offenses available for prosecution. Will future prosecutions
transfer wholesale the offenses and their elements from the
MCA and MMC? Will prosecutors instead utilize existing federal crimes? Will Congress enact modified MCA crimes?
If former detainees are charged with some form of Murder
in Violation of the Law of War, judges present before such
prosecutions will have the duty to ensure an actual violation of
the law of war occurred. Yet the MMC’s problematic definition
also presents larger issues concerning the rule of law that the
Obama Administration must heed. Before employing or borrowing from the MCA and MMC, the new administration must
carefully scrutinize executive interpretations of MCA crimes
and ensure that prosecutions of former Guantánamo detainees
abide by the Constitution and the law of war.
A. JUDGES SHOULD APPLY THE (ACTUAL) LAW OF WAR
The first and most direct remedy to the MMC’s statutory
and constitutional inadequacies involves the judiciary. If some
form of MCA substantive offenses and MMC procedural rules
are transferred to future prosecutions, the former military
commissions illustrate the importance of the judge’s role: it will
fall on the judge in the first instance to appropriately interpret
when the law of war may be violated by disregarding the
MMC’s comment as deficient in any legal basis and contrary to
express congressional intent. The MMC only purports to “provide[] guidance,”165 and judges would not overstep their judicial
authority by declining to apply the MMC’s definition.
Instead, judges presiding over prosecutions for Murder in
Violation of the Law of War must require juries to find as an
independent element that the accused violated the law of
war.166 The MMC itself requires that for each offense, the instructions on findings must contain a description of the indi-

163. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
164. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Where Will Guantánamo Detainees
Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at A13 (explaining that finding a prison willing and able to accommodate detainees will be difficult).
165. MMC, supra note 11, at IV-1.
166. Id. at IV-12.
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vidual elements,167 and the government bears the burden of
proving “beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of each substantive offense charged.”168 Accordingly, judges should present
juries with a specific findings instruction that the alleged killing violated the law of war. To find that the accused violated
the law of war, the judge must ask the jury to consider the status of the victim and not whether the combatant was lawful or
not. The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was a protected person, one who was taking no active part
in the hostilities.169
Should judges fail to apply the correct definition of when
murder violates the law of war, the lawyers defending those accused of the crime will likely appeal. The Secretary of Defense’s
interpretation will be difficult to uphold, as the MMC contains
no citations to legal authority and the great weight of existing
law-of-war interpretations indicate that the MMC’s definition
is incorrect. While an appellate court should overturn any application of the Secretary of Defense’s definition, the consequence would be another trial with appropriate jury instructions. Those instructions would require the jury to find as two
independent elements that the killing was unlawful (i.e., committed without combatant immunity) and that the killing violated the law of war (i.e., committed against a protected person). Since trials of detainees are already cumbersome due to
evidentiary and procedural difficulties,170 and since many detainees from Guantánamo already have been held upwards of
six years,171 as a matter of fairness and systemic efficiency, it
would be preferable for the judge to get it right the first time.

167. Id. at II-114 to -115. The Rules for Military Commissions, contained
within the MMC, provide the procedural rules for the military commissions.
Id. at I-3; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS § 101
(2007).
168. MMC, supra note 11, at II-14; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 167,
§ 202.
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(D) (2006); Geneva Convention I, supra note
18, arts. 3, 12, 24; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 6.2.6.
170. See William Glaberson & Eric Lichtblau, Guantánamo Detainee’s Trial Opens, Ending a Seven-Year Legal Tangle, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at
A12.
171. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008).
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B. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION MUST ENSURE FUTURE
PROSECUTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF WAR ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND
More fundamentally, however, there is something disturbing in the MMC’s redefinition of when murder violates the law
of war. Surely it is a reasonable presumption that Secretary of
Defense Gates was familiar with U.S. military law, federal law,
and the law of war when he promulgated the MMC. Why then
does the MMC attempt to define Murder in Violation of the
Law of War in a manner contrary to all three?
Without delving into subjective intent, the objective effect
of the MMC’s redefinition is a drastic expansion of substantive
jurisdiction for the military commissions. While the law of war
serves the purpose of protecting civilians and soldiers hors de
combat,172 by focusing on the accused’s status rather than the
victim’s, the MMC twists the law of war to serve a prosecutorial
function.173 According to the MMC, the U.S. government needs
to prove only that the accused acted unlawfully and gets a free
pass on proving a violation of the law of war.174 Yet such an approach ignores the corpus of military commission jurisprudence: violating the law of war is the essential predicate for establishing substantive jurisdiction.175 Deliberately redefining
the law of war to facilitate jurisdiction and convictions over detainees like Omar Khadr, who have not violated the law of war,
offends basic notions of fairness and justice. Even the Executive
is bound to comply with the rule of law.176
As the Obama Administration moves forward with prosecutions of former Guantánamo detainees, regardless of where
they occur, it must be mindful that only Congress can define or
codify violations of the law of war. Whether in Guantánamo,
federal court, or some variation of the two,177 Congress cannot
delegate to the Secretary of Defense the authority to invent
new ways to violate the law of war in order to facilitate convic172. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
173. See Macklin, supra note 66 (illustrating the “heads I win; tails you
lose” quality of the prosecution’s interpretation of the law of war).
174. See MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11.
175. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006), superseded by
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241–42; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13; Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).
176. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
177. See Warrick & DeYoung, supra note 59.
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tions of detainees. Further, if the administration transposes
substantive offenses from the MCA to other tribunals, it must
scrutinize each one to determine whether the Secretary of Defense has attempted to modify, expand, or—in the case of Murder in Violation of the Law of War—completely invert the law
of war.178
President Obama also should issue an executive order reaffirming the government’s commitment to abiding by the law of
war. His first two executive orders related to Guantánamo detainees invoke the Geneva Conventions as providing a minimum baseline for U.S. activity.179 An additional executive order
should affirm—as federal law and the U.S. military already
do180—the Geneva Conventions as the starting point for determining violations of the law of war for any relevant substantive
offense. Such an order would prohibit “creative” interpretations
of the law of war within the executive branch, thereby creating
an additional check on the constitutionality of law-of-war prosecutions.
If the Obama Administration were to simply transfer the
substantive offenses and their corresponding elements from the
MCA and MMC to prosecutions of former Guantánamo detainees and future defendants accused of terrorist acts, it would
continue to grant the prosecutors a free pass on proving an essential element of the crime. Inside or outside of a military
commission, if the charge alleges a violation of the law of war,
the government must prove that such a violation occurred. Allowing the executive branch to redefine violations of the law of
war in order to cast a large net of potentially lethal criminal
liability around detainees violates fundamental constitutional
barriers separating the powers of the government.
CONCLUSION
When the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, promulgated the elements of the
crime of Murder in Violation of the Law of War, he included a
comment that taking acts as an “unlawful combatant” in and of
itself violates the law of war. By focusing on the status of the
offender rather than the victim, this definition of Murder in Vi178. See Corn, supra note 77, at 38 (finding that the MMC lessens proof
requirements for the offense of Murder of Protected Persons).
179. See Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,491 § 6, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
180. See supra notes 35, 40–41 and accompanying text.
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olation of the Law of War is irreconcilable with the widely established standard that murder only violates the law of war
when committed against a protected person, who is someone
taking no active part in the hostilities. This definition impermissibly expands the limited jurisdiction of the military commissions to allow prosecution of those who have not violated
any law of war, such as Omar Khadr, the then-fifteen-year old
charged with throwing a grenade at a U.S. soldier while under
attack. The Secretary of Defense lacked both statutory and constitutional authority to redefine when the law of war may be
violated.
Judges presiding over prosecutions for Murder in Violation
of the Law of War should disregard the Secretary’s definition
and require that juries find an actual violation of the law of
war. The Obama Administration, in future law-of-war prosecutions, must not transpose the substantive offenses of the MCA
without carefully scrutinizing the Secretary of Defense’s interpretations of those crimes. To do otherwise would violate the
constitutional separation of powers, disregard the law of war,
and pave the way for easier and unfair convictions for crimes
that carry the death penalty.

